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CASENOTES

Harmful Error:I

Arizona v. Fulminante
and the Expansion of the
Harmless-Error Rule
I.

INTRODUCTION

For over fifty years the United States Supreme Court has
overturned convictions based on the use of coerced confessions at
trial. 2 Even where the remaining evidence supported a conviction,
the Court has nonetheless ordered a new trial with the confession
excluded.'
In Arizona v. Fulminante,4 the Supreme Court revisited a familiar topic, namely coerced confessions. In Fulminante, as in
6
previous decisions,' a coerced confession was admitted during trial.
Given the vast body of precedent barring the use of coerced confessions at trial, it seemed likely that the Fulminante Court would rule
accordingly. However, the Court defied prediction and held that if
admission of a coerced confession was harmless error,' then a new

trial was unnecessary.'

1. See Eric Neisser, Can Government Coercion Ever Be Harmless?, N.J. L.J.,
Apr. 25, 1991, at 13 (concluding that Arizona v. Fulminante interferes with our
constitutional structure and is a serious harmful error).
2. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 & n.6 (1986); New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8
(1967); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 540-41 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404-05
(1945); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
3. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
4. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
5. For citations to such cases, see supra note 2.
6. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1250-51 (1991).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988). The harmless-error rule states: "On the hearing of
any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an
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In extending the scope of the harmless-error doctrine to include
coerced confessions, the Court noted the doctrine applied to "trial
error," 9 and not to "structural defects." 0 "Trial error" was defined
as "error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the
jury,'' which could then be quantitatively compared to the other
evidence to decide if admission of the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 12 The Court described "structural defects" as
defects that affected the framework in which a trial proceeded. 3
After analyzing coerced confessions, the Court concluded they were
"trial errors," and were therefore subject to harmless-error analysis.'

4

The Fulminante majority reached this conclusion by way of
questionable reasoning. Not only did the majority ignore welldeveloped case law that mandated reversal of a conviction based on
a coerced confession, but the Court also failed to explain why this
precedent was no longer valid. In addition, the Court based its
decision on a hazy distinction between "trial error" and "structural
defects."
Moreover, the Fulminante decision promises troubling ramifications for the future. Specifically, Fulminante has created inconsistency within the area of law dealing with coerced confessions,
increased the possibility for unfair trials, and narrowed defendants'
due process rights.
To support these assertions this note examines the Arizona v.
Fulminante decision. Part II discusses coerced confessions and their
historical relationship to the harmless-error rule. Part III presents
the facts, the procedural history, and the Supreme Court's decision
in Arizona v. Fulminante. Part IV explains why application of the
harmless-error doctrine to involuntary confessions is inappropriate.
Part V indicates the problems Fulminante portends for the future.
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." Id. The harmless-error rule is also codified in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights should be disregarded." FED. R. Cram.
P. 52(a).
8. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.

9. Id. at 1264-65.
10. Id. See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
"trial error" and "structural defects."
11. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1265.
14. Id.
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II.
A.

BACKGROUND

INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS

In eighteenth century England only voluntary confessions were
admitted into evidence because involuntary confessions 5 were considered untrustworthy.16 The underlying reason for this rule was that
a person subjected to physical or psychological torture might confess
to a crime he or she did not commit. 7
Early United States Supreme Court decisions adopted the English common law treatment of coerced confessions. For example, in
Hopt v. Utah" the Court recognized that "[a] confession, if freely
and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character." ' 9 Likewise, in Sparf v. United States20 the Court reiterated that
"'a deliberate voluntary confession of guilt is among the most
effectual proofs in the law, and constitutes the strongest evidence
against the party making it .... ,,,21 The common law approach,
however, was limited in that the states were not bound because there
is no constitutional basis allowing federal courts to instruct state
22
courts on how the common law should be applied.
15. A "confession is involuntary if it is not the product of an essentially free

and unrestrained choice of its maker or where maker's will is overborne at the time of
the confession." BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNRY 827 (6th ed. 1990).
16. 3 JOHN H. WiOMORE, WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE § 822, at 329 n. 1 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970). For an in-depth analysis of the history of confessions, see id. at §§ 817863.
17. Id.at 329 n.l.
18. 110 U.S. 574 (1884), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
20. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
21. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895) (quoting King v. Warickshall,
1 Leach, 263); accord Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896).
22. DAVID M. NissMAN ET AL., LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 1:2, at 5 (1985). But see
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.)
(The Court held that involuntary confessions violated the right against self-incrimination
and were "controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."'). Bram's holding appears to be an anomaly for it
was later criticized in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 190-91 n.35 (1953), overruled
by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In addition, when Bram was decided the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was not yet incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 113 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was incorporated, thus binding the states, in
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3 overcame this limitation as the Supreme
Brown v. MississipptP
Court, through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,24 overturned a conviction based on Brown's confession, which
was obtained after he was repeatedly tortured.2 5 The Court stated
that when a conviction is based on a confession obtained through

violence,

[t]he due process clause requires 'that state action . . . shall
be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice' . ...

It would be difficult to conceive of methods

more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to

procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of

the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and
26
sentence was a clear denial of due process.

Although in Brown the Supreme Court used the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn a state conviction
based on a coerced confession, some commentators point out that
the Court's underlying rationale nonetheless was the common law
notion that coerced confessions are not reliable evidence because
they are untrustworthy. 27 Thus, while a new theory, due process,
1964. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). For a complete treatment of the Fifth
Amendment's applicability to the states, see CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 117, at 284 (3d ed. 1984).
23. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
24. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936).
26. Id. at 286. Later the Court held confessions obtained through psychological
torture would also overturn a conviction. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 23940 (1940) (Defendants, denied food and rest, confessed to murder after being interrogated for a week.).
27. Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 43 (1962); see also J.A.
Spanogle, The Use of Coerced Confessions in State Courts, 17 VAND. L. REv. 421,
423 (1964) (Spanogle suggests that Brown and a subsequent decision, Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), "could easily be squared with the common law untrustworthiness rationale."). Cf Francis A. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 16, 19 (1953) (noting that in Brown there
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was used to void convictions based on coerced confessions, the old
common law theory had not been repudiated.

2s
However, subsequent decisions such as Lisenba v. California,

Brown v. A lien, 29 and Stroble v. California,30 signalled the Court's
shift away from the untrustworthiness theory as justification for

32
3
overturning convictions based on coerced confessions. ' The Lisenba
Court recognized that the untrustworthiness theory did not provide

an adequate constitutional basis for overturning state convictions.33
The Court reasoned that the policy rationales behind the untrustworthiness theory and the Due Process Clause were not analogous. It

stated that the "aim of the [common law] rule that a confession is
inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is to exclude false evi-

dence"; but "[tihe aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
'3 4
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."

was not an opportunity to discuss the untrustworthiness rationale since the result would
be "equally clear" whether the reliability of the confession or the due process concerns
were used to decide the case).
28. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
29. 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953) ("When the facts admitted by the state show

coercion ... a conviction will be set aside as violative of due process .... This is

true even though the. evidence apart from the confessions might have been sufficient
to sustain the jury's verdict.") (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940))),
overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 (1992).
30. 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952) ("When this Court is asked to reverse a state
court conviction as wanting in due process, illegal acts of state officials prior to trial
are relevant only as they bear on petitioner's contention that he has been deprived
of a fair trial, either through the use of a coerced confession or otherwise.") (citations
omitted).
31. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951) (A confession is
inadmissible "only when the circumstances under which it is received violate" the
principles the Fourteenth Amendment protects.); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55
(1949) (The Fourteenth Amendment's "Due Process Clause bars police procedure
which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and
vitiates a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure .

. . .");

Haley v. Ohio,

332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) ("The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the police from
using the private, secret custody of either man or child as a device for wringing
confessions from them."); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) ("A coerced
confession is offensive to basic standards of justice ...."); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,

322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (The situation "is so inherently coercive that its very
existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom .... ).

32. 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (conviction of murder upheld even though defendant
was slapped once and questioned for prolonged periods of time).
33. Ritz, supra note 27, at 44.
34. Lisenba, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

From the foregoing cases it is evident that due process has
supplanted the common law untrustworthiness theory as the primary
justification for voiding convictions based on coerced confessions.
This does not mean the Court is indifferent to the admission of false
evidence;3" rather, these cases illustrate the primacy of the constitutional principle of due process over the common law's untrustworthi36
ness theory.
B. HARMLESS ERROR

The application of the harmless-error rule 3 to constitutional
38 In Chapman the
errors had its genesis in Chapman v. California.
defendants were convicted at a trial in which the prosecutor commented on the defendants' failure to testify, as allowed by state
constitutional law.3 9 Also, the judge instructed the jury that adverse
inferences could be drawn from this failure to testify. 40 Before the
defendants appealed their case, the state constitutional provision was
invalidated. 4' The California Supreme Court recognized that the defendants were denied a federal constitutional right, but applied the
42
state's harmless-error rule and upheld the convictions.
In determining whether the comments surrounding the defendants' failure to testify required a reversal of their conviction, the
35. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953) ("[Rleliance on a coerced
confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession combines the persuasiveness
of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and
deceptive evidence."), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384 (1964)
(stating that Stein was "a short-lived departure from prior views of the Court.").
36. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (Justice Frankfurter
stated that convictions resting on involuntary confessions must be overturned "not
because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system .... "); see also Roger
J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial,
33 U. Cm. L. REv. 657, 667 (1966) (recognizing the shift from the untrustworthiness
theory to due process concerns).
37. For a definition of the harmless-error rule, see supra note 7.
38. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For a thorough analysis of the Chapman decision and
the harmless-error doctrine, see Philip J. Mause, Harmless ConstitutionalError: The
MINN. L. REV. 519
TRAYNOR, THE RMDLE OF HARM.ESS ERROR (1970).

Implications of Chapman v. California, 53
ROGER

J.

(1969); see generally

39. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19 (1967).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 19-20. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), overruled this
provision.
42. Id. at 20.
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United States Supreme Court noted that in particular cases some
constitutional errors, because of their insignificance, may be considered harmless, "thereby not requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction. ' 43 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the error in
Chapman was not harmless because the state failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error did not contribute to
defendants' convictions." Subsequent cases have greatly expanded the
4
types of constitutional error subject to harmless-error analysiss.
While Chapman announced a general rule of applying harmlesserror analysis to constitutional error, Chapman itself also recognized
exceptions to the application of the rule: "our prior cases have
indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error."46
Three errors were specifically excluded from harmless-error analysis:
a biased judge, 47 denial of counsel, 48 and use of a coerced confession
49
at trial.
Payne v. Arkansas,50 which Chapman cited to illustrate the
inapplicability of harmless error to coerced confessions, involved a
mentally dull youth whose confession was used to convict him of
murder. 5 The youth confessed after the Police Chief promised to try
to protect the boy from an approaching mob, if the boy told the
truth.5 2 Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a coerced
confession is part of the evidence before the jury, even though there
is sufficient other evidence to support a conviction, the coerced
confession invalidates the judgment because the defendant's due
process rights have been violated.53 Payne, in conjunction with Chap43. Id. at 22.
44. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 (1987) (jury instruction
misstating an element of the offense); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986)
(erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his
confession); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 & n.2 (1983) (denial of a
defendant's right to be present at trial); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)
(failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
46. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
48. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
49. Id. (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)).
50. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
51. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1958).
52. Id. at 566-67.
53. Id. at 567-68. The Court's full quote reads:
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man, strongly suggests that harmless-error analysis is inapplicable to
54
coerced confessions.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held since Chap5
man that convictions based on coerced confessions must be reversed.
This was the status of the law when the Supreme Court decided
56
Arizona v. Fulminante.
III.
A.

ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE

FACTS

On September 16, 1982, Oreste Fulminante's stepdaughter, Jeneane, was found murdered in an Arizona desert. 57 Fulminante became
a suspect 8 in her murder, but when no charges were filed against him
59
he left the state for New Jersey.

Id.

Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there was adequate
evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict. But where, as here, an
involuntary confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and
a general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly
held that even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart from
the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission
in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment
because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

54. See Mause, supra note 38, at 539 (explaining that a case resting on an
involuntary confession requires automatic reversal). But cf. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process in Need of a
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 31-32 (1976) (suggesting that the Court, after
Chapman, might not reverse a conviction based on a coerced confession).
55. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) ("Despite the strong
interests that support the harmless-error doctrine, the Court in Chapman recognized
that some constitutional errors require reversal without regard to the evidence in the
particular case."); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) ("[Amny criminal
trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process
of law . ... ") (alteration in original); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1972)
(quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964)) ('It is now axiomatic that
a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is
founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for
the truth or falsity of the confession."').
56. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
57. Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991). She had been shot
twice in the head at close range with a large caliber weapon, and a ligature was found
around her neck. Id.
58. Fulminante was in charge of Jeneane from September 7-14 since his wife
was in the hospital. On the wife's return she discovered Fulminante's revolver was
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In 1983, Fulminante was arrested and incarcerated for possession

of a firearm by a felon.60 While in prison he befriended another

inmate, Anthony Sarivola.61 Sarivola, a former policeman, was a paid
informant 62 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 63 Sarivola heard
a rumor that Fulminante was a suspect in Jeneane's murder, but

Fulminante consistently denied any role in her murder. 64 Later, Sarivola learned Fulminante was getting rough treatment from other
inmates because of the rumor. 65 Sarivola offered Fulminante protection from the other inmates if Fulminante told him about the events
surrounding Jeneane's death. 66 Fulminante then confessed to murder67
ing Jeneane.
Seven months after this confession to Sarivola, Fulminante was
released from prison. 6 Fulminante thereafter had a conversation with
Sarivola's fiancee, Donna, wherein he confessed he "could not go
back to Arizona because he had killed a little girl there." 69 Based
largely on these two confessions, Fulminante was indicted in September of 1984 for the first-degree murder of Jeneane. 70
missing from their bedroom. The day before Jeneane disappeared, Fulminante traded
a rifle for an extra barrel for his .357 revolver. Because of this transaction and his
inconsistent statements regarding Jeneane's disappearance, Fulminante became a
suspect. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *8-9, Arizona v. Fulminante, I11S. Ct.
1246 (1991) (No. 89-839) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (hereinafter Writ of
Certiorari).
59. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1250.
60. Id. Fulminante's previous criminal record included a felony conviction for
impairing the morals of a child, and forging an endorsement on a check. State v.
Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 606 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1246
(1991).
61. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1250.
62. Sarivola was connected with organized crime before being arrested for
extortion in 1982. After his arrest he agreed to become an FBI informant, and was
paid on a contingent fee basis for information that could be used against other
inmates. The FBI paid Sarivola $22,490.00 between March of 1983 and September
of 1984. Brief for the Respondent at *8-9, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct 1246
(1991) (No. 89-839) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (hereinafter Respondent's
Brief).
63. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. Fulminante admitted to driving Jeneane to the desert, choking her,
sexually assaulting her, and making her beg for her life before shooting her twice in
the head. Id.
68. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
69. Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at *10.
70. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1250.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At trial, both confessions were deemed voluntary and admitted

into evidence. 7' Fulminante was convicted of Jeneane's murder and
sentenced to death. 72 He appealed his conviction in State v. Fulmi73
nante.
In State v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court of Arizona initially
affirmed the lower court's holding, but it used a different analysis
than that of the trial court. 74 First, the court decided Fulminante's

confession to Sarivola was involuntary. 75 The court focused on the
76
fact that Fulminante confessed to Sarivola, a paid FBI informant,

and that Fulminante's confession coincided with Sarivola's offer of

protection from the other inmates. 77 The court stated that for a
confession to be voluntary it "must not have been obtained by 'any
direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence."' 7 Second, the court decided that because Ful-

minante's confession to Donna was admissible, 79 any error regarding
the confession to Sarivola was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.8 0
In looking at the evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
Fulminante's second confession established his guilt, which the other
evidence corroborated.' The court concluded "the invalid first con-

71. Id. at 1250-51. Fulminante "asserted that the confession to Sarivola was
coerced, and that the second confession was the 'fruit' of the first." Id. The fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine involves "[elvidence which is spawned by or directly
derived from an illegal search or illegal interrogation [and] is generally inadmissible
against the defendant because of its original taint .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
670 (6th ed. 1990); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (discussing
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine); see generally STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

the "fruits" of illegal searches).

(1977) (analyzing

72. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
73. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 609.

76. For a discussion about Sarivola, see supra note 62.
77. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, at 609, aff'd on other grounds, 111 S.
Ct. 1246 (1991).
78. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
79. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 609 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Fulminante's confession to Donna was held admissible
because it had occurred six months after his initial confession, and it was made after
he was released from prison, so presumably Fulminante did not need protection

anymore. Id. at 611. Also, he confessed during a casual conversation to someone
who was not an agent of the state. Id.
80. Id. at 609-10. The court came to this conclusion by using a harmless-error
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fession was cumulative of the admissible second confession." 82 Consequently, the court decided that admission of the first confession
was harmless error. 3 To support its reasoning, the court cited and
followed federal precedent that applied harmless-error analysis to
involuntary confessions."
Fulminante submitted a motion to reconsider, arguing that prior
Supreme Court rulings precluded categorizing coerced confessions as
harmless error.8 The Arizona Supreme Court agreed and observed
that the cases initially relied upon "were not cases in which the first
confession was a coerced confession in violation of defendant's fifth
amendment rights. "86 The court then acknowledged that federal precedent compelled it to hold that the admission of the original coerced
confession could not be considered harmless error.8 7 The court reversed Fulminante's conviction and remanded for a new trial without
the use of his confession to Sarivola..88
standard that focuses "on whether there is overwhelming additional evidence sufficient to establish the prosecution's case." Id. at 610.
81. Id. at 610-11. The court specifically pointed to the "[p]hysical evidence
from the wounds, the ligature, location of the crime scene and motorcycle tracks."
Id.
82. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 610-11 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
83. Id. The court stated: "The admission of the first confession was, therefore,
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
84. Id. at 610 (citing United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir.
1987) (admission of invalid oral confession was harmless error when subsequent
written confession was admissible and more credible); Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364,
367 (1st Cir. 1986) (court admitted subsequent written confession that strongly
indicated guilt), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 907 (1986); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d
918, 932-34 (11th Cir. 1985) (improper admission of first confession was harmless
error when a lawful confession was later admitted at trial), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
909 (1986); United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d 1151, 1157 (8th Cir. 1984) (harmless
error when subsequent statements reiterated earlier inadmissible statements and
strongly indicated guilt)).
85. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 626 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Fulminante had seven contentions, but the court decided that
only the claim regarding coerced confessions was meritorious. Id.
86. Id. The cases the court relied upon dealt with Miranda rights. Id.; see also
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1256 n.7 (1991) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985)) ("[A] Miranda violation 'does not mean that the statements
received have actually been coerced, but only that the courts will presume the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised."').
87. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd on other grounds,
Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
88. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the differing views in the state and federal courts as to whether
coerced confessions admitted at trial were subject to harmless-error
analysis. 9 In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the
harmless-error rule applied to coerced confessions. 90
C. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that Chapman
v. California9' announced that constitutional errors do not automatically require the reversal of a conviction. 92 The Court listed cases
where an automatic reversal was not required, 93 and concluded that
the similarity among them which did not mandate reversal was that
they all involved "trial error." 94 The Court defined "trial error" as
an "error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the
jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context
of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt." 95 The Court concluded
that coerced confessions fell under this definition. 96
Before explaining why coerced confessions were "trial errors,"
the Court distinguished two key cases, Chapman v. California97 and

89. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991).
90. Id. at 1263-66. The Court resolved three issues: (1) Fulminante's confession
was coerced; (2) harmless-error analysis applies to coerced confessions; and (3)
admission of Fulminante's first confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. As to the first holding, which Justice White wrote, the majority consisted of
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia. As to the second holding, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, the majority consisted of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Scalia. Finally, as to the third holding, written by Justice White, the
majority consisted of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy. This
casenote focuses on the Court's second holding.
91. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
92. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1263 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967)).
93. Id. at 1263. For case citations where automatic reversal is not required, see
supra note 45.
94. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264.
95. Id. at 1263-64 (emphasis added). The Court described the use of the
harmless-error analysis as essential to preserving the purpose of criminal trials. That
purpose is "to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and
promote[] public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial
error." Id. at 1264 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
96. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).

97. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); see supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text

discussing Chapman.
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Payne v. Arkansas,98 in order to show that there was no precedent
hindering the Court from applying harmless-error analysis to coerced
confessions. Chapman announced that harmless-error analysis applied
to constitutional errors: "[ajlthough our prior cases have indicated
that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that

their infraction can never be treated as harmless error .. . [not] all

trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for
reversal." 99 Chapman"00 also, albeit in a footnote, specifically listed
three cases involving constitutional rights to which the harmless-error
rule did not apply, including Payne v. Arkansas,0 1 which dealt with
a coerced confession. However, the Fulminante majority maintained
that the Chapman language .'[a]lthough our prior cases have indicated,"' when combined with the citation of Payne in a footnote,
was properly viewed as a historical reference to Payne's holding,
rather than precedent holding that harmless-error analysis was inapplicable to coerced confessions. 10 2
To reinforce its conclusion that the cases listed in the Chapman
footnote were merely historical references, the Court distinguished
Payne v. Arkansas. The Payne Court stated:
Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there
was adequate evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict.
But where, as here, an involuntary confession constitutes a
part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is
returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave
to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has
uniformly held that even though there may have been sufficient
evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a
judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because
98. 356 U.S. 560 (1958); see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text discussing
Payne.
99. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
100. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (deprivation
of counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased judge)).
101. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
102. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). The dissent did not make this distinction, but
pointed out that the cases before and after Chapman prohibited the use of coerced
confessions against a defendant; thus, stare decisis applied. Id. at 1254 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 03
Using this language, the Fulminante majority decided that Payne did
not reject the harmless-error analysis that Chapman later adopted,
but rather a more lenient test which allowed affirmance of a conviction
if there was sufficient evidence, other than the coerced confession, to
sustain the verdict.' 0 4 In contrast, the harmless-error test requires the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the conviction. Thus, a sufficiency test would render
analysis of admitted coerced confessions a hollow formality because
it would make admission of a coerced confession almost risk-free for
the state, unlike the more rigorous harmless-error test. 05 Apparently
the majority concluded that Chapman could only footnote to Payne
as a historical reference, rather than as precedent showing that
harmless-error analysis was inapplicable to coerced confessions, simply
because Payne was not discussing a harmless-error test.
In contrast, the dissent read Payne as clearly recogniking that use
of a coerced confession automatically invalidated a conviction, "regardless" the amount of other evidence. 1°6 This interpretation of
Payne suggests that the Payne Court would have rejected both a
sufficiency test and a harmless-error test. In other words, because
admittance of a coerced confession requires the automatic reversal of
a conviction, a court will not apply any test to determine if the
conviction can be salvaged.
The dissent used the majority's definition of "trial error" to
support this reading of Payne.0 7 The majority held that coerced
confessions were "trial errors," because coerced confessions, like
other "trial errors," could be quantitatively assessed with the other
evidence before the jury to decide if admission of the error was
harmless. 01 8 However, the dissent argued that when a coerced confes103. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
104. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264 (noting that Justice Clark's dissent in Payne
confirmed the idea that Payne dealt with a more lenient sufficiency analysis). A
sufficiency analysis looks to the adequacy of the remaining evidence and ignores any
impact admission of the coerced confession may have had; if the other evidence
supports the conviction any such impact does not matter. Harmless error, however,
looks to the impact the admission of the coerced confession had on the trial to the
exclusion of the other evidence.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Arizona v. Fulminante, I1l S. Ct. 1246, 1254 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1264.
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sion is admitted and the jury returns a general verdict' 9 of guilty, the
0
weight and credit the jury gave the confession cannot be determined."
Because the weight given the coerced confession cannot be quantitatively assessed, coerced confessions are not "trial errors," and thus,

'defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards.""1
After determining that Chapman and Payne did not prohibit the
application of harmless-error analysis to coerced confessions, the
majority explained why coerced confessions were "trial errors." The
majority delineated between coerced confessions and the other two
3
constitutional violations, deprivation of counsel" 2 and biased judge,"
referred to in the Chapman footnote." 4 These violations were classified as "structural defects," which affected the framework in which
a trial proceeded." 5 Such "structural defects" tainted the entire trial
because .'"[without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundainnocence, and no
6
fair.'
mentally
By contrast, coerced confessions were considered "trial errors"
that only affected the "trial process itself.""' Admission of a coerced
confession does not result in a trial structured to the detriment of the
defendant. Rather, it results in a tactical loss to the defendant. Such
109. A general verdict is "[a] verdict whereby the jury find either for the plaintiff
or for the defendant in general terms; the ordinary form of a verdict." Glenn v.
Sumner, 132 U.S. 152, 156 (1889).
110. Fulminate, 111 S.Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Payne v.

Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958)).
111. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.)).
112. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113. See Tumey v.Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
114. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991); see also Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
115. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1265.
116. Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
117. Id. The dissent did not think a distinction could be made between "trial
errors" and "structural defects" inthe trial mechanism when deciding what could
be considered harmless error. Id. at 1254-55 (White, J., dissenting). As an example,
the dissent stated that the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence
was susceptible to harmless-error analysis, but the failure to instruct a jury on the
reasonable doubt standard was not. Id. at 1255. The labels of "trial error" or
"structural defect" break down, the dissent asserted, because both those instructions
occur at the same stage of the trial. Id. The dissent pointed out that the "omission
of a reasonable doubt instruction, though a 'trial error,' distorts the very structure
of the trial because it creates the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if
the State has not met its required burden of proof." Id.
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tactical losses or disadvantages can, of course, be quantitatively
assessed and subjected to harmless-error analysis. The Court held as
such because it could see no difference between a coerced confession
and the other constitutional errors subject to harmless-error analysis."' The Court reasoned that such errors all had the exact same
evidentiary impact upon the trial record." 9 Accordingly, the majority
stated that when a court reviewed the admission of a coerced confession, it would, "as it does with the admission of other forms of
improperly admitted evidence, simply review[] the remainder of the
evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of
the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' ' 20
To further support its holding that coerced confessions were
susceptible to harmless-error analysis, the Court noted that confessions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment were also subject
to harmless-error analysis.12 ' The majority was unable to discern any
functional difference between the impact on a trial of admitting a
coerced confession or a confession obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Consequently, the Court determined that the "inconsistent treatment of statements elicited in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments ... can be supported neither by evidentiary
or deterrence concerns nor by the belief that there is something more
'fundamental' about involuntary confessions." 12
Finally, the Court conceded that coerced confessions could have
a more dramatic effect than other "trial errors" on the course of a
118. Id. at 1265. The Court specifically mentioned "confession[s] obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment - of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment - or of a prosecutor's improper comment on a defendant's silence at
trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
119. Id.
120. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
121. Id. (citing Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972)). The dissent argued
that "a coerced confession is fundamentally different from other types of erroneously
admitted evidence to which the [harmless-error] rule has been applied." Id. at 1254
(White, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent reasoned that there were specific
distinctions between confessions obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1256. First, coerced confessions may be untrustworthy, which "may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial . . . ." Id. Second,
"permitting a coerced confession to be part of the evidence on which a jury is free
to base its verdict of guilty is inconsistent with the thesis that ours is not an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice." Id.
122. Fulminate, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. The Court thought this was especially true
when no physical violence is used by the police to extract the confession. Id. at 1266.
It went on to say that law enforcement violations of other constitutional rights can
involve police conduct as flagrant as eliciting a coerced confession. Id. But see id. at
1255-56 (White, J., dissenting).
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trial, and in some cases, admission of the coerced confession could
be devastating to a defendant. 12 3 But according to the majority, this
was not a reason to avoid the harmless-error test. l2 In such cases the
reviewing court would simply2 conclude that admission of the confession was not harmless error.

IV.

ANALYsIs

Since Brown v. Mississippi26 the Supreme Court has consistently
held that convictions cannot rest, in whole or in part, on coerced
confessions. 27 Arizona v. Fulminante flies in the face of this vast
body of cases and is an unjustified, unprincipled departure from this
precedent. This body of case law and the dissent's arguments will be
used to highlight the invalidity of the Fulminante majority's holding.
There are two major flaws in the majority's holding. First, the
majority ignored fifty years of precedent disallowing convictions based
on coerced confessions; second, the majority's purported distinction
between "trial errors" and "structural defects" cannot withstand
scrutiny.
There are two problems with the majority's failure to follow
relevant precedent. First, the majority disregarded the doctrine of
stare decisis. Additionally, the Court neglected to explain why this
precedent was no longer valid.
The benefits that stare decisis engenders have been thoroughly
documented. 128 Because of its importance, the dissent used the majority's disregard for stare decisis as its primary argument against the
majority opinion. 129 In its opinion, the majority not only failed to
follow precedent, it also ignored a large body of applicable cases.
This is hard to rectify inasmuch as overturning convictions based on
123. Id. at 1266.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text discussing
Brown.

127. For case citations, see examples in supra note 2.
128. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-98
(1987). For example, stare decisis helps achieve consistent results in similar cases
which avoids unfair decisions. Id. at 595-97. It also adds predictability to judicial
decisions which allows people to plan their lives, and "avoid the paralysis of
foreseeing only the unknown." Id. at 597. Additionally, stare decisis promotes
judicial economy because less time is spent on issues a court has already addressed.
Id. at 599.
129. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253-54 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (citing forty years of precedent).
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coerced confessions was a "fundamental tenet" of the criminal law
system up to the Fulminante decision. 3 0
More importantly, the Court failed to explain why this precedent

was no longer valid. Although stare decisis is not an unyielding
command,' and may have less influence in constitutional cases,3 2

when the Court overrules constitutional precedent it should still offer
"special justification" for doing so.' "Special justification" requires
the Court to argue its decision on the merits, and to show one of the
following: that a changed condition has weakened the precedent's
support, that lower courts are not able to apply the old rule, or that
there is conflicting precedent.'3 4 Adherence to these justifications when
overturning precedent indicates the Court's decision is not based on
the majority's arbitrary, personal beliefs, but on a principled analysis
of the law.' 35 This principled analysis not only garners respect for the
judiciary, but also protects the precedential framework in which our
system of justice operates. Unfortunately, in its abandonment of stare
decisis the Fulminante Court failed to offer any justification, let alone
one of these traditional justifications. This departure from precedent
would have been more reasonable if past Courts had used unpersuasive
or inconsistent arguments to overturn convictions involving coerced
confessions, but this is not the case.
Since 1936, the Court has overturned convictions involving coerced confessions for two reasons. First, is that a coerced confession
may be untrustworthy. 3 6 Although this has not been the Court's
130. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588 (1986) (recognizing that a conviction cannot stand if a
coerced confession is admitted at trial); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541
(1961) (arguing that the-State cannot use a defendant's coerced coercion to prove its
case); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (due process is denied when
coerced confession is used).
131. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991); see also The Supreme
Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REv. 177, 182 (1991) (discussing
Payne and its impact on stare decisis).
132. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991) (citing Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
133. The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 131, at 182.

134. Id.
135. Id. at 183 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen governing
legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere
exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.")).
136. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (observing that
one problem arising from an erroneously admitted coerced confession is the likelihood
that the confession is untrue).
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primary basis for overturning convictions, it is still a valid reason to

do S0.137 If a defendant confesses merely to avoid mental or physical
cruelty, this will affect the truth-seeking function of a trial, a function
the majority decided was central to a criminal trial. 38 More importantly, convictions have been overturned because the admission of a
coerced confession violates a defendant's due process rights. 39 This
fundamental right is violated because the presence of a coerced
confession renders a criminal trial unfair for a defendant.' 40 Our
society recognizes "that important human values are sacrificed where

an agency of the government ... wrings a conviction out of an
accused against his will.' 4' Therefore, a trial loses all semblance of
fairness when inquisition replaces accusation. 42 Courts, before and
after Fulminante, have adamantly argued that admission of a coerced
confession does too much damage to a defendant's due process rights
to ever allow a conviction involving one to stand. 43 Because the
importance of due process has not diminished, the Fulminante Court
should have adhered to precedent.
Although Fulminante recognized that admission of a coerced
confession could be devastating to a defendant, it noted that in those
situations a reviewing court would simply conclude that its admission
was not harmless error.' 44 This argument, however, ignores an impor137. For a discussion of the untrustworthiness theory, see supra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text.
138. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1256 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
The majority stated that the .'central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence .

.

.

'

Id. at 1264 (quoting

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
139. For a discussion of cases using the Due Process Clause to overturn
convictions, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
140. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 & n.6 (1986) (observing that
admittance at trial of a coerced confession "render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair");
see, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952) (recognizing that a coerced
confession deprives a defendant of a fair trial).
141. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
142. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (stating that "ours
is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system"); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
55 (1949) (noting that the Due Process Clause forbids procedures that violate an
accusatorial mode of prosecuting crimes).
143. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944) ("The Constitution of
the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an
American court by means of a coerced confession."); Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44,
1991 WL 207111, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991) (recognizing that coerced
confessions admitted into evidence demand reversal), aff'd, State v. Quintero, 480
*N.W.2d 50 (1992).
144. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1266 (1991).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

tant point: that a coerced confession is "probably the most probative
and damaging evidence" used against a defendant. 45 Because criminal
trials result in general verdicts, there is no way to know how much
weight the jury gave the confession. 146 This is why the Supreme Court
has shown reluctance in trusting juries to ignore the probative value
of a confession, even if coerced. 47 Because the impact of a coerced
confession on a jury's verdict is immeasurable, a reviewing court
would be unable to decide if it was harmless or not. Consequently,
subjecting coerced confessions to harmless-error analysis is inappropriate because of the potential harm to defendants.
It appears that the Fulminante majority avoided justifying its
overturning of precedent through its narrow reading of applicable
case law. The Court implied that because Payne v. Arkansas14 did
not reject harmless-error review, there was no other precedent pre-

venting the Court from applying harmless error to coerced confession
cases. 149 However, the majority misinterpreted Payne, and erroneously

concluded that no other precedent needed to be addressed.
The majority decided Payne did not reject the harmless-error test
that Chapman v. California5 ° later adopted, but rather a more lenient
sufficiency test.' As the dissent noted, this interpretation distorts the
Payne decision.' The Payne Court held that a conviction must be
overturned when "a coerced confession constitutes a part of the
evidence before the jury and general verdict is returned, [since] no
one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession."'5
This language illustrates the Payne Court would overturn a conviction
involving a coerced confession, "regardless" the amount of other
evidence before the court. 5 4 Therefore, Payne would have rejected
both a sufficiency test and a harmless-error test. In other words,
because admittance of a coerced confession requires the automatic
reversal of a conviction, applying any test to determine whether a
conviction can be salvaged is impermissible.
145. Id. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.
186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Idaho v. Wright 110 S. Ct. 3139

(1990)).

146. Id. at 1254 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958)).
147. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972).

148. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Fulminante, Ill S.Ct. at 1264.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
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In addition to Payne's unambiguous language, other Courts have
interpreted Payne as refusing to subject coerced confessions to harmless-error analysis. For example, the majority in Chapman footnoted
to Payne as an example of a constitutional error that could never be
57
treated as harmless error.'" The concurring 1 6 and dissenting' Justices
also read Payne as refusing to apply harmless-error analysis to coerced
confessions. Rose v. Clark' explicitly interpreted Payne in the same
way. Also, Mincey v. Arizona' cited to the Chapman footnote as
precedent that a judgment based on a coerced confession had to be
overturned, regardless of the amount of other evidence supporting it.
Consequently, before Fulminante, there was no uncertainty as to
Payne's holding.
Besides misinterpreting Payne, the majority incorrectly assumed
that there was no other precedent needing to be addressed. Aside
from Payne, a substantial number of cases reversed, or recognized
6°
the need to reverse, convictions based on coerced confessions.' The
majority's purpose in distinguishing Payne was to show that Payne
had not rejected harmless-error review of coerced confessions. This,
however, did not distinguish the substantial body of cases, before and
after Payne, that implicitly rejected harmless-error review by automatically reversing judgments based on coerced confessions. The
Fulminante Court ignored these cases and treated Payne as the only
case dealing with the analysis of convictions based on coerced confessions. Apparently the Court ignored what it could not refute.
Not only did the majority ignore precedent, it also drew an
6
invalid distinction between "trial errors" and "structural defects." '
The majority defined "trial error" as "an error in the trial process
itself"; whereas a "structural defect" affects the framework in which
a trial proceeds. 62 The majority decided coerced confessions were
155. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967).
156. Id. at 42-44 (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing that there may be other
exceptions to the harmless-error rule besides coerced confessions).
157. Id. at 52 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927)) (alleging that coerced confessions could never be harmless error).
158. 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 & n.6 (1986).
159. 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
160. E.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Lyons
v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 & n.1 (1944).
161. Arizona v. Fulminante, II1 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991).
162. Id. at 1265. For a discussion of "trial errors" and "structural defects,"
see supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
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"trial errors" subject to harmless-error review.' 63 Prompting this
conclusion was the evidentiary impact of admitting a coerced confession at trial.'16 The majority contended that if a coerced confession
was admitted as evidence, a reviewing court could simply look at all
the evidence and decide if the "admission of the confession was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 65 Thus, the majority concluded
that the evidentiary impact of coerced confessions was indistinguishable from other constitutional "trial errors" that could be considered
harmless error. 16
The dissent effectively dispatched this argument. First, it proved
the majority's distinction between "trial errors" and "structural
defects" was invalid.' 67 The dissent accomplished this through its
comparison of jury instructions on the presumption of innocence' 68
and reasonable doubt standard. 69 Under the majority's definition, a
"trial error" occurs during the presentation of a case to the jury. 70
The presumption of innocence instruction and reasonable doubt standard also occur during this time frame. 71 Therefore, following the
majority's definition, both should be subject to harmless-error analysis. However, this is not the case. On the one hand, omission of the
reasonable doubt standard falls under the majority's definition of
"trial error." But on the other hand, omission of the reasonable
doubt standard falls under the majority's definition of "structural
defects" because it "distorts the very structure of the trial because it
creates the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the
State has not met its required burden of proof.' 1 72 Consequently, the
majority's distinction fails by its own terms. As the dissent stated:
"these cases can be reconciled only by considering the nature of the
right at issue and the effect of an error upon the trial."'' 73
Furthermore, the reason for excluding coerced confessions goes
beyond evidentiary concerns. The search for truth is critical to a trial,
but an individual's constitutional rights should not fall victim to that
search.' 74 The Supreme Court has stressed this view:
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Fulminante, III S. Ct. at 1265.
Id. at 1265.
Id.
Arizona v. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
Id. at 1254-55 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1255 (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)).
Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 & n.14 (1979)).
Id. at 1264.
Arizona v. Fulminante, II I S. Ct. 1246, 1255 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
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'certain constitutional rights

protect important values that
are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial.' The
right of a defendant not to have his coerced confession used
against him is among those rights, for using a coerced confession 'abort[s] the basic trial process' and 'render[s] a trial
fundamentally unfair." 75
. . .

By focusing solely on the evidentiary concerns of coerced confessions, the majority disregarded a defendant's fundamental right to
due process. As the dissent recognized, "the use of coerced confessions, 'whether true or false,' is forbidden 'because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of
our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial

system

....

176

Furthermore, the Fulminante majority ignored the

Court's shift away from the common law theory for excluding coerced
confessions to its current preference for due process concerns.7
Thus, not only was the majority's distinction between "trial
errors" and "structural defects" based on ambiguous and flawed
reasoning, but the Court's focus on the evidentiary concerns of
coerced confessions ignored defendants' due process rights. Unfortunately, these problems will negatively affect how lower courts interpret
Fulminante,and how potential defendants are treated whose situations
are analogous to Oreste Fulminante's case.
V.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

Only a short time was needed before the most obvious negative
effect of Arizona v. Fulminante materialized, inconsistent state court
decisions. Two additional implications raise concerns: first, the greater
potential for unfair trials, and second, the narrowing of defendants'
due process rights.
Prior to Fulminante, convictions involving coerced confessions
were uniformly overturned. However, Fulminante held that if a
coerced confession is erroneously admitted into evidence, instead of
Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Errorto Coerced
Confessions, 105 HARv. L. REv. 152, 170 (1991) (stating that some constitutional
values should "trump" accuracy).
175. Arizona v. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1257 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 587 & n.6 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
176. Id. at 1256 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961)).
177. For a discussion of the Court's shift from using the untrustworthiness
theory to due process concerns, see supra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
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overturning the conviction, the confession is now subject to harmlesserror analysis.' This reversal of precedent only leads to confusion
and inconsistency in this area of law.
Already this confusion has manifested itself. In Iowa v. Quintero, 7 9 the Iowa Appellate Court considered whether the trial court
erred in not suppressing a defendant's allegedly coerced statements.8 0
The court recognized the Supreme Court's holding in Fulminante,but
refused to follow it."'1 The court stated that, unlike the Supreme

Court, it was not able to distinguish between coerced confessions and
other "structural defects," such as denial of the right to counsel or a
biased judge.8 2 The court argued that coerced confessions could be
untrustworthy, and that they completely destroy the adversarial system. 83 Consequently, the court, relying on the Due Process Clause
contained in the Iowa Constitution,8 4 held that the admission of a
coerced confession into evidence is still cause for automatic reversal. 8 5
Conversely, People v. Toran s6 followed Fulminante'sholding.8

7

The court quoted passages from Fulminante which stated that coerced
confessions were "trial errors," and like other "trial errors," were
subject to harmless-error analysis.' The court agreed that Fulminante
should be followed, and applied Fulminante's holding to the case
before it.189

178. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1261 (1991).
179. Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27,
1991), aff'd, State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50 (1992).
180. Id.at *1.
181. Id. at *6-7.
182. Id. at *7.
183. Id.
184. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9 (The Due Process Clause states: "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). The court
noted that Iowa's Constitution "contains due process guarantees substantially the
same as those in the fourteenth amendment." Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44, 1991
WL 207111, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991), aff'd, State v. Quintero, 480
N.W.2d 50 (1992). The court then stated that "[tihe United States Supreme Court
sets the minimum guarantees of due process required under the federal constitution;
however, Iowa courts are the guardians of the due process rights reserved under the
Iowa Constitution, and may grant such additional protections as are necessary to
satisfy the Iowa Constitution." Id. (citations omitted).
185. Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44, 1991 WL 207111, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
27, 1991), aff'd, State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50 (1992).
186. 580 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
187. People v. Toran, 580 N.E.2d 595, 598 (I11.App. Ct. 1991) (citing Arizona
v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265-66 (1991)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 598-99.
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These two contemporaneous cases indicate that Fulminante creates confusion within this area of law. Instead of appellate courts
"simply review[ing] the ... evidence against a defendant to determine
whether the admission of the confession was harmless,"'9 courts may
decide to rely on their own state constitutions to avoid Fulminante's
holding in order to protect a defendant's due process rights. Therefore, no longer is this area of law uniform from state to state.
This inconsistent treatment among states leads to confusion for
practitioners also. Because Fulminante did not explicitly reject the
vast body of case law overturning convictions involving coerced
confessions, a lawyer will now have the difficult decision of deciding
whether his or her state will follow Fulminante. Unfortunately, an
accurate decision of how a state court will treat Fulminante might not
be revealed until that practitioner is trying a case involving the
admission of a coerced confession.
Not only are states uncomfortable with Fulminante's holding,
but so are members of Congress. There is a section in a proposed
House bill' overruling Fulminante. The bill states that "[tihe admission into evidence of a coerced confession shall not be considered
harmless error. For the purposes of this section, a confession is
coerced if it is elicited in violation of the [F]ifth or [Fjourteenth
[A]rticles of [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States."1 92
Potential for unfair trials is a more serious repercussion of
Fulminante. Chapman v. California'9a noted that some constitutional
rights are so basic to a fair trial that their violation can never be
considered harmless error. 94 One of these constitutional rights, as
Chapman recognized, was a trial devoid of coerced confessions.195
There are two conceivable ways Fulminante'sholding could lead
to an unfair trial. First, the Court's holding will send a message to
the police that coercing a suspect's confession will not automatically
ruin a case against that individual. This concern was voiced thirty
years ago in Spano v. New York: 19 there is a "deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the
end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
H.R. 3371, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Id.
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
Id. at 23 n.8.
360 U.S. 315 (1959), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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criminals themselves."'' 97 The Court's holding in Fulminante could
turn this concern into a reality. Because a coerced confession may be
considered harmless error, police officers may see no danger in
exerting excessive pressure on a defendant to confess to a crime. 98 If
the officer's coercive methods are successful there is a greater chance
for a conviction, inasmuch as a defendant's confession might be the
most probative and damaging evidence used against the defendant.' 99
Even if the police officer's methods are revealed in court, a conviction
will stand if the court rules admission of the confession was harmless
error. Besides the obvious unfairness of having a defendant's coerced
confession used against him or her at trial, there is little protection
against an unfair trial even if the judge rules the confession was
harmless error. For when the jury returns with a general verdict, the
credit and weight the jury gave the confession is unknown. 2°°
Second, Fulminante'sholding may result in an unfair trial for a
defendant because judges may not be as cautious in excluding confessions bordering between voluntary and coerced. The reason is that
"an arguably involuntary confession [will not] automatically blow the
whole case" because harmless error may save the conviction on
appeal.2 0 1
The third, and perhaps most serious effect of Fulminante, is the
narrowing of defendants' rights under the Due Process Clause.
Throughout past case law, the Court excluded coerced confessions
because they violated due process of law. Despite this precedent, the
majority concluded that there was no difference between coerced
confessions and constitutional errors that were subject to harmlesserror analysis. 0 2 This holding directly contradicted precedent which
held "the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced
confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process

197. Spano v.New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959), overruled by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
198. See Neisser, supra note 1, at 13 (suggesting that police may now have an

incentive to beat a confession out of a prisoner); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Devaluing

MANHATTAN LAW., July 1991, at 15 (maintaining that officers may now feel
that "coercing confessions may sometimes pay, at least if [it is] not too obvious

Liberty,

. . . . "1).

199. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1255 (1991) (citing Cruz v. New
York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by Idaho v. Wright,
110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990)).
200. Payne v.Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
201. Taylor, supra note 198, at 15.
202. Arizona v.Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 3 It would now appear that
because coerced confessions do not mandate reversal of a conviction,
the Due Process Clause offers individuals less protection. Iowa v.
Quintero2 4 illustrates this point, for the court would not follow
Fulminante because it thought the admission of an involuntary confession violated the due process clause of its state constitution.0 5 The
Quintero court recognized that the adversarial nature of the trial was
26
subverted when an involuntary confession was admitted as evidence. 0
Thus, 'a defendant's due process rights would be violated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Arizona v. Fulminante07 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the harmless-error doctrine applied to coerced confessions admitted at trial. Divorcing itself from a long history of
cases, the Court held that it did. The Court reached this conclusion
by examining constitutional errors that could be considered harmless.
The Court labeled these "trial errors," and decided coerced confessions belonged in this group.
However, the Court's decision is problematic for two reasons.
First, in reaching its decision the Court ignored the doctrine of stare
decisis. Furthermore, the Court neglected to explain why the reasoning
of those cases was no longer valid. Second, the Court's sole reason
for holding that harmless error was applicable to coerced confessions
was based on an invalid distinction between "trial errors" and "structural defects." Not only was it impossible to draw a distinct line
between the two, but in coming to this conclusion the Court focused
on the evidentiary effects on the trial of admitting coerced confessions,
to the exclusion of more important due process concerns.
This decision may have a great impact on criminal trials in which
coerced confessions are allowed. The consequences include confusing
the law in an area that had been settled, increasing the chances that
a defendant may undergo an unfair trial, and lastly, narrowing a
defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause.
The Court's holding in Arizona v. Fulminante rejects a valuable
lesson that past Courts continually recognized and respected: that
203. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).

204. No. 90-44, 1991 WL 207111 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991), aff'd, State
v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50 (1992).
205. Iowa v. Quintero, No. 90-44, 1991 WL 207111, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
27, 1991), aff'd, State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50 (1992).

206. Id.

207. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
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even though the search for truth is important to our system of justice,
some constitutional rights should not be classified as harmless error
because they protect important human values unrelated to the truthseeking function of the trial." 8
SHAWN 0. MILLER

208. Id. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

